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Abstract. The proliferation of smartphones has changed our life due to the en-
hanced connectivity, increased storage capacity and innovative functionality 
they offer. Their increased popularity has drawn the attention of attackers, thus, 
nowadays their users are exposed to many security and privacy threats. The fact 
that smartphones store significant data (e.g. personal, business, government, 
etc.) in combination with their mobility, increase the impact of unauthorized 
physical access to smartphones. However, past research has revealed that this is 
not clearly understood by smartphone users, as they disregard the available se-
curity controls. In this context, this paper explores the attitudes and perceptions 
towards security controls that protect smartphone user’s data from unauthorized 
physical access. We conducted a survey to measure their adoption and the rea-
sons behind users’ selections. Our results, suggest that nowadays users are more 
concerned about their physical security, but still reveal that a considerable por-
tion of our sample is prone to unauthorized physical access. 
Keywords: User acceptance of security policies and technologies; Smartphone; 
Security Control; Authentication; Anti-Theft, Biometrics 
1 Introduction 
Smartphones as multi-purpose and ubiquitous devices have managed to change the 
users’ everyday life. Users carry smartphones throughout the day in different, and 
often insecure locations, accessing a plethora of heterogeneous data. Usually, the 
same device is used for both personal and business purposes [19], [22] thus 
smartphones store and/or have access to important data, which must be protected from 
unauthorized access.  
At the same time, smartphone users tend to forget their devices in public places [5] 
and, as a study from Symantec suggests, device finders tend to try to access sensitive 
data that are stored in a lost device, e.g. personal data (e.g. social media accounts) and 
business data (e.g. corporate human resource files) [8]. As such, the risk of unauthor-
ized physical access to user’s data (in a permanent or temporal device loss) is signifi-
cant, both for individuals and organizations. Moreover, nowadays the request for 
more security controls against device theft has been implemented by smartphone ven-
dors reducing the number of device theft [4] and unauthorized access to smartphone 
data. However, this protection is rendered useless unless the respective security con-
trols (such as encryption, remote wipe, etc.) are activated in the device. 
In this context, we conducted a user survey in order to explore the attitudes and 
perceptions towards security controls that protect against unauthorized physical ac-
cess to the device data (hereinafter referred to as unauthorized physical access). Our 
study focuses on Android and iOS, which currently hold 95% of the smartphone mar-
ket share [6]. Our results, suggest that nowadays users are more concerned about their 
physical security, but still reveal that a considerable portion of our sample is prone to 
unauthorized physical access. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents related work and Section 3 
provides the methodology of our work. Section 4 presents our results. Finally, Section 
5 includes a discussion of the results and concludes the paper.  
2 Background 
2.1 Adversary model and assumptions.  
In this work, we assume the following adversary model. The malicious attacker has 
gained temporary (i.e. the device owner has not had his device stolen or lost) or per-
manent access to the smartphone. We assume that the attacker has the knowledge, 
skills and hardware in order to access device data either with a logical or a physical 
acquisition. An attacker, however, can access user data remotely (e.g. malicious ap-
plications that violate user privacy [20]), but this falls outside the scope of this paper. 
Finally, we assume average users, i.e. not technically and security savvy ones. 
2.2. Related work 
Smartphone users can authenticate and access their device with traditional passwords 
(PINs (Personal Identification Number) or alphanumeric strings). Unfortunately, users 
prefer usability, thus choosing memorable passwords that are easy to recall [12], but 
easy to recover with dictionary attacks [15]. The proliferation of smartphones made 
other authentication mechanisms popular, e.g. graphical passwords and biometrics 
(e.g. facial recognition, fingerprint reader).  
 Graphical passwords are vulnerable to ‘traditional’ password attacks (e.g. shoulder 
surfing [21], [25] and brute force attacks [13]), as well as attacks that are unique to 
graphical passwords due to traces and oily residues left on the screen (i.e. smudge 
attacks [11], [9,10]. Andriotis et al. [9,10] focused on human factors that might affect 
the choice of graphical passwords on a smartphone (such as sub-patterns and starting 
points), which in combination with smudge attacks can be used to infer the graphical 
passwords. Finally, in [23] the authors studied the effect of pattern layout on the 
strength of graphical passwords.  
Biometrics as a means of authentication was introduced in the fourth version of 
Android, with the use of the smartphone’s camera for face recognition. However, this 
security control is not popular, as it can be bypassed with a photograph of the device 
owner. Modern and more expensive smartphones offer fingerprint readers to provide 
user authentication to the device. Although, the use of this security control is conven-
ient, it has already been proven to be vulnerable to various attacks [7]. 
Smartphone vendors have introduced several security controls against device theft 
to increase post-theft data control, such as Find My iPhone of iCloud and Android 
Device Manager (ADM) of Google Play. Other third party apps offer similar func-
tionalities such as Prey, Theftie, Avast Anti-Theft and Norton Mobile Security. 
All these anti-theft apps support locating a smartphone on a map, playing a sound 
on a smartphone to help finding it, locking and tracking a smartphone, as well as re-
motely wiping the data on a stolen or lost smartphone. Remote wiping mechanisms 
allow owners to remotely delete sensitive data by sending a wipe command to the lost 
devices through the Internet or SMS [24]. Although, the majority of these anti-theft 
apps require the smartphone to be online, Find My iPhone suspends all credit and 
debit cards in Passbook for Apple Pay immediately, even if the iPhone is offline. 
Some anti-theft apps allow the user to wipe confidential files by sending a special 
SMS, such as Avast Anti-Theft and Norton Mobile Security.  
With iOS 7 (released Q3 of 2013) and later, Find My iPhone is activated by default 
and includes a feature called Activation Lock, which is turned on automatically. Acti-
vation Lock makes it harder for anyone to use or sell an iPhone if it is lost or stolen. 
This is true, as an Apple ID and password are required before anyone can turn off 
Find My iPhone, sign out of iCloud or erase and reactivate the smartphone. On the 
other side, Android Device Manager (released Q4 of 2013) is part of Google’s system 
application suite for all Android devices (version 2.2 and newer). Unlike, other An-
droid third-party applications, where permissions are granted manually by users dur-
ing installation, ADM can be manually enabled via the user’s Google account. 
In the user study that was conducted in Q4 of 2011 [19] it was found that 
smartphone users in the UK and Greece do not use available security controls that can 
protect smartphone data from unauthorized physical access, namely device locking, 
remote device locator, encryption and remote data wipe. Moreover, the analysis in 
[18] revealed that even security savvy users did not protect their data from unauthor-
ized physical access. Moreover, the authors in [16] also studied in Q4 of 2013 the 
adoption of device locking, as well as the reasons for (not) using this control. Also, 
their results suggest that less than half of the sample used device locking and that the 
participants underestimated the time that they spend to unlock their device.  
Chin et al. [14] carried out a user study to gain insights into user perceptions of 
smartphone security, in Q4 of 2011 and Q1 of 2012. Their study shows that both An-
droid and iPhone participants seem equally concerned about phone loss and damage. 
Kraus et al. [17] examined how privacy and security knowledge and global infor-
mation privacy concern of a user, influence mobile protection behavior. They found 
that low knowledge and low global information privacy concern can serve as predic-
tors for not using the protection methods, whereas high knowledge and high concern 
can serve as predictors for the usage of the evaluated protection methods. 
3 Methodology 
To explore the adoption of physical security controls in smartphones we conducted a 
survey with an online questionnaire. The survey took place from November 2014 to 
January 2015 and targeted smartphone users who are based in the United Kingdom. 
The questionnaire was distributed via word of mouth, social media, and groups and 
societies in West Midlands. Before launching the survey we completed a pilot survey 
in the lab with 6 participants in order to validate the questionnaire.  
The survey starts by asking the participants demographic questions (c.f. Appen-
dix). Then, users are asked whether they use a locking mechanism (e.g. password, 
biometric) in their device. According to their responses, the participants are asked for 
the reasons why they do so, as well as the type of locking mechanism that they use. 
Next, the sample is asked if they use a password for an individual application on their 
device and according to their responses, the reasons why they do so. The last part of 
the survey asks users whether they have had their device stolen. Also, the participants 
are asked whether they use any anti-theft mechanism (such as remote data wipe, re-
mote device locator, encryption, etc., c.f. Appendix) and the reason for doing so. The 
questionnaire uses open ended questions to collect from the participants the reasons 
why they use a security control or not. The participants directly expressed their rea-
sons either directly, e.g. “the control is not useful to me”, or indirectly “to protect my 
stuff from people who want to snoop me”. 
We collected data from 208 survey participants. After the removal of participants 
who were not Android or iOS users and/or any incomplete questionnaires or data that 
failed our data validation, we ended up with 192 participants. Among them, 48% used 
Android, ~65% were male and 82% were aged [18-35] (minage = 18 maxage = 67). 
Regarding their IT skills the respondents classified themselves: (a) 11% non-
technically savvy (‘moderate’ IT), (b) 42% with good IT skills, and (c) 47% techni-
cally savvy (‘excellent’ IT). Finally, 17% of the participants had their device stolen. 
The next section presents our findings from descriptive and inferential statics (χ2 
tests and φ coefficient). We compare our common results with the UK sample, which 
was collected in [19] and is referred to as UK2011 sample. It is worth noting that 
compared to UK2011 [19], the users have more options with regards to locking their 
devices, and the threat of unauthorized physical access is more well-known [4,5], [8]. 
  
Fig. 1. Distribution of device lock mechanisms in Android and iOS users  
4 Results 
4.1 Results regarding device locking 
An early finding in our analysis is that currently smartphone users, lock their device 
more frequently (76%) than in the past (compared to the ~61% in the UK sample in 
[19], c.f. Figure 1). The results revealed that 40% of the participants used application 
passwords, which is a considerable amount of participants if one considers that this is 
a third-party app that the user has to find and install on his own. 
More specifically, the analysis revealed that 67% of the Android participants and 
84% iOS participants lock their device. As summarized in Fig. 1, while PIN is the 
most popular authentication mechanism in our sample, a considerable number of our 
participants used patterns and fingerprints for their authentication.  
Our results suggest that in Android, patterns or graphical passwords are popular 
and user friendly alternatives to PINs, whereas fewer participants used fingerprint 
readers for their authentication and none used facial recognition (Fig. 1). On the other 
hand, the results suggest that iOS users opt for PIN and ﬁngerprint readers. It is worth 
noting that, currently, fingerprint readers are only provided by expensive smartphones 
and, as a result, the popularity of this control might increase in the future, when the 
cost of the devices drops.  
When the participants were asked about the reasons for using the abovementioned 
controls, they attributed security and privacy as the main reason (79% of the sample) 
for using a particular device locking control. The rest of the reasons that were identi-
fied were: ease of use (41%), organization policy (3%) and default settings (8%). 
Moreover, our results suggest that the participants who use the fingerprint reader, 
selected the control because of its ease of use (χ2 = 16.452, p = 0.00005, φ = 0.337). We 
did not find any statistically significant correlation between the rest of the reasons and 
device locking controls.  
 Fig. 2. Adoption of security controls by the UK2011 sample in [19] 
Fig. 3 depicts the reasons1 the participants are not using the device locking and ap-
plication passwords. In both cases the participants claimed that the security controls 
were not needed. In addition, as Fig. 3b suggests, currently a considerable amount of 
our participants are not aware of application passwords, which is somewhat expected 
as this control is only available as a third-party application. 
Our analysis revealed that almost one third of the participants who had their device 
stolen (10 out of 32) did not lock their device, leaving their device and its data ex-
posed to unauthorized access. Among them, 5 participants had both device locking 
and application passwords disabled. 
Finally, as in [19] the analysis revealed that the IT skills of the participants affect 
the adoption of security controls. In this survey, as depicted in Fig. 4, the technical 
savvy participants tend to lock their device. However, we did not find such finding for 
application password. 
 
Fig. 3. (a) Reasons the participants do not use device locking (b) Reasons the participants do 
not use application password 
                                                          
1 The reasons are self-explanatory, except for “Accessibility” that refers to any 
impairment that prevents the participant from using the control.  
  
  
Fig. 4. Adoption of device lock vs. the IT skills of the participants 
4.2 Results regarding anti-theft controls 
The analysis revealed that 51% of the sample used an anti-theft control. Our analysis 
suggests that remote finding the device was the security control that was mostly used 
by the participants, followed by remote locking and remote data wiping. Considerably 
less participants reported the use of encryption and remote picture taking. The afore-
mentioned are summarized in Figure 5. Also, the results reveal that the participants 
who use remote picture taking are more likely to be Android users (χ2 = 8.402, p = 0.04, 
φ = 0.209). We did not find any other statistically significant correlation between the 
adoption of the anti-theft controls and the participants’ operating system, or their IT 
skills and the adoption of anti-theft controls. 
It is worth noting that the analysis revealed the same misconception about encryp-
tion that was found in [19], stemming from the fact that in iOS the device is encrypted 
when the user enables device lock [3]. Specifically, in this work, we found 45 iOS 
participants who were using a PIN out of which 43 of them (96%) reported that they 
are not using encryption. Similarly, 33 iOS survey participants used the ﬁngerprint 
reader and 31 of them (94%) did not know that they were using encryption.  
 
Fig. 5. Distribution of anti-theft security controls in the sample 
When asked about the reasons of using anti-theft controls, again the majority of re-
spondents identified security and privacy as their main reason (85%), followed by 
default settings (11%) and organization policy (4%). Also, as Fig. 6 suggests, lack of 
knowledge about the existence of anti-theft controls was the main reason why the 
respondents ignored them.  
When comparing our results with the UK2011 sample, there are less participants 
(17%) who did not lock their device and did not use anti-theft controls (c.f. Fig. 2). 
Amongst them, five participants have had their device stolen in the past, which in-
creases their risk of unauthorized access to their device. 
As in [18,19], the analysis revealed multiple statistical significant correlations be-
tween pairs of security controls. More specifically, the participants tend to have disa-
bled the following security controls: (a) remote finding and encryption (χ2(1) = 9.550, p 
= 0.02, φ = 0.223), (b) remote finding and remote device lock (χ2(1) = 42.148, p <001, φ = 
0.469), (c) remote ringing and remote locking (χ2(1) = 62.520, p < 0.001, φ = 0.571), (d) 
remote finding and remote picture taking (χ2(1) = 17.847, p < 0.001, φ = 0.305), (e) re-
mote finding and remote wiping (χ2(1) = 36.992, p < 0.001, φ = 0.439), (f) remote wiping 
and remote locking (χ2(1) = 62.273, p < 0.001, φ = 0.570), (g) remote ringing and remote 
finding (χ2(1) = 37.008, p < 0.001, φ = 0.439), and (h) device ringing and device wiping 
(χ2(1) = 57.202, p < 0.001, φ = 0.546). 
The analysis also revealed statistically significant correlations regarding the use of 
the controls, namely: (a) participants who encrypt their device are more likely to use 
remote device locator (χ2(1) = 9.550, p = 0.02, φ = 0.223), (b) participants who unlock 
their device with their fingerprint are more likely to use remote device locator (χ2(1) = 
7.476, p = 0.06, φ = 0.197), (c) participants who enable remote locking tend to enable 
remote finding (χ2(1) = 42.148, p <001, φ = 0.469), (d) participants tend to enable remote 
locking and remote ringing together (χ2(1) = 62.520, p < 0.001, φ = 0.571), (e) partici-
pants tend to enable remote locking and remote wiping together (χ2(1) = 62.273, p < 
0.001, φ = 0.570), (f) participants who enable remote picture taking tend to enable re-
mote finding (χ2(1) = 17.847, p < 0.001, φ = 0.305), (f) participants who enable remote 
wiping tend to use remote finding (χ2(1) = 36.992, p < 0.001, φ = 0.439), (g) participants 
who enable remote ringing tend use remote finding (χ2(1) = 37.008, p < 0.001, φ = 
0.439), and (h) participants tend to enable device ringing and device wiping together 
(χ2(1) = 57.202, p < 0.001, φ = 0.546).  
 
Fig. 6. Reasons the participants do not use ant-theft controls 
 
 5 Discussion and conclusions 
The commercialization of smartphones has introduced threats with regards to the 
security and privacy of their users. The devices store and process heterogeneous data, 
which must be protected from unauthorized access. The owners of these devices are 
not necessary security savvy and thus may be unaware of the relevant threats and 
countermeasures. 
In this paper, we have examined the adoption of security controls that protect users 
from unauthorized physical access. We have conducted a survey with participants 
from the United Kingdom in order to explore the use of security controls, as well as 
the reasons for (not) using device locking (such as PINs, graphical passwords, and 
fingerprint readers) and anti-theft controls (such as remote wipe and remote finding 
the device, etc.). Our findings suggest that, compared to surveys that preceded ours 
[16], [18,19], smartphone users tend to use the available controls more frequently, 
which is particularly true for device locking controls.  
One of the reasons for this is that nowadays smartphones offer controls that are 
easier to use, which - as our results suggest - gradually replace PINs and passwords 
(e.g. graphical passwords in Android and fingerprint readers in iOS). Another reason 
is that users have been trained to authenticate with passwords, e.g. before they access 
their computer/laptop or online services (e.g. social media) and, as a result, they are 
aware about device unlocking. However, as our results suggest, this does not hold for 
application passwords and the anti-theft controls, since a main reason behind not us-
ing these controls is users’ unawareness of their existence. 
The demographics of our sample introduce limitations to our work. Thus, it might 
be the case, that our findings are biased towards the demographics of our sample. 
Moreover, our survey used an online questionnaire, thus, it relies on self-reported 
data. However, we consider that our results give considerable insights regarding the 
attitudes and perceptions towards physical security controls. This holds true, as our 
results are validated from the common security findings of the most recent related 
survey [16], which studied the use of device locking and the reasons for (not) using 
this control. More specifically, in [16] participants also attributed security and privacy 
as the main reason for using the security control. Similarly to our results, the main 
reason for not using device locking was user perception that the control is not needed.  
PIN is still the most popular device locking control as it has been revealed in this 
work, as well as in [16], [19]. However, in our work we found that other controls are 
getting more popular, such as the graphical passwords and the fingerprint readers. We 
consider that the latter will gain more popularity in the near future as the cost of the 
devices that are offering them decreases. This holds true, as we found that the partici-
pants who were using fingerprint readers identified ease of use as a reason for its se-
lection. The fingerprint reader seamlessly authenticates the user and does not interrupt 
her from fulfilling tasks, especially when a task might last less time than the authenti-
cation attempt (e.g. in the case that the user needs to check the calendar and has to 
first enter a PIN/password). This is an important factor if one considers the amount of 
time that users spend in order to unlock into their devices [16]. 
Our results, as in [18,19] reveal occasions in which users disable or enable together 
the controls that allow the user to remotely control her device (e.g. lock it, wipe it, 
find it, etc.). One obvious reason for this is that they are managed by the same soft-
ware/configuration interface. Finally, as in [18,19], this work revealed iOS users who 
had encryption enabled by default without knowing it. This is a security feature that 
could be adopted by Android to protect its user base, especially if one consider the 
low adoption of encryption by Android respondents. 
As future work, we plan to repeat this user survey to examine if the attitudes and 
perceptions of smartphone users with regards to physical security controls will signif-
icantly change. 
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Appendix 
Questionnaire 
Q1: What is your gender? Only one choice of {Male, Female} 
Q2: What is your age? (Open-ended question) 
Q3: How good are you with computers in general? Only one choice of {Excellent, Good, 
Moderate} 
Q4: What is your smartphone operating system? Only one choice of {Android, Apple iOS, 
Windows Phone, Blackberry, I do not know, Other} 
Q5: Do you use a mechanism on your smartphone to lock/protect it? Only one choice of 
{Yes, No} 
Q5a: What type of locking mechanism do you use on your smartphone? (Only shown if Q5 
answer is "Yes", Multiple choices of {Numerical password (PIN), Alphanumerical password 
(characters and/or numbers), Graphical password (patterns), Fingerprint readers, Facial recogni-
tion, Other} 
Q5b: Why do you use this locking mechanism? (Only shown if Q5 answer is "Yes") (Open-
ended question) 
Q5c: Why you chose not to use a locking mechanism? (Only shown if Q5 answer is "No") 
(Open-ended question) 
Q6: Do you use passwords for individual applications on your smartphone? Only one 
choice of {Yes, No} 
Q6a: Why you use a password for applications on your smartphone? (Only shown if Q6 
answer is "Yes") (Open-ended question) 
Q6b: Why you chose not to use a password for applications on your smartphone? (Only 
shown if Q6 answer is "No") (Open-ended question) 
Q7: Have you ever had your smartphone stolen? Only one choice of {Yes, No} 
Q8: Do you use any anti-theft mechanisms on your smartphone? Only one choice of {Yes, 
No} 
Q8a: What type of anti-theft mechanisms do you have? (Only shown if Q8 answer is "Yes", 
Multiple choices of { Remotely wipe data, Remotely find the device location, File encryption, 
Remotely take pictures using the smartphone camera, Remotely lock the smartphone, Remotely 
ring the smartphone, Other} 
Q8b: Why you do have anti-theft mechanisms? (Only shown if Q8 answer is "Yes") (Open-
ended question) 
Q8c: Why you chose not to have anti-theft mechanisms? (Only shown if Q8 answer is "No") 
(Open-ended question) 
